CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS BONN JUNE 2009 NGO NEWSLETTER

eco

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PLEDGED ISSUE

Eco has been published by Non-Governmental Environmental Groups at major international conferences since the Stockholm Environment Conference in 1972. This issue is produced co-operatively by CAN groups attending the climate negotiations in Bonn, June 2009.

No Pledge and Review for Finance

ECO is intrigued by reports from the Major Economies Forum and from the preparations for the EU finance ministers meeting that the Mexican proposal – which is based on pledged contributions – has been welcomed with open arms by many countries. We agree that one single consolidated fund is a good start. But there is a high risk that this fund could remain an empty vessel unless it is attached to a revenue raising mechanism and strict compliance. ECO's contacts in Annex 1 countries also suggest that initial enthusiasm for the Norwegian Proposal seems to have waned somewhat. Could this be because it raises large amounts of revenue automatically and certain key finance ministries from developed country parties actually don't really want to pay such large amounts of money?

Without adding in revenue raising and robust compliance mechanisms, the Mexican proposal is dependent upon assessed pledges. And history tells us that pledges don't really work. Let's take a look at the NAPAs as an example of how pledges deliver. At last count, only US$200 million out of an estimated US$2 billion have been delivered (but not yet paid out). And what about aid commitments? Africa is still waiting for the bold pledges made at the Gleneagles G8 summit in 2005 to be fulfilled… developing countries are still waiting for the pledge of 0.7% of developed country GNI as assistance given way back in the 1960s to be made good.

This does not auger well for DELIVERING finance for an effective post-2012 agreement. ECO urges all developed country parties, and particularly the EU who are currently discussing the merits of different finance proposals, to take these concerns on board and to champion proposals that provide new, additional and innovative ways of raising the massive sums of money needed. Otherwise poor countries will yet again be betrayed by the empty promises of rich countries.

But darling, you promised me the money at Gleneagles!

Just Imagine…

Imagine a world in which the LULUCF negotiations had a level of ambition that matched the urgency of the climate problem. LULUCF has been treated as a slush fund to generate easy – even make-believe – compliance units for so long now that it is hard to envision a world in which the sector might *contribute* to Annex I targets, rather than weaken them. But let us try.

It seems relatively non-controversial that overall Annex I targets must provide a large climate benefit relative to historic and projected future levels. And, that such targets would require significant investment and structural changes in the energy sector.

REDD approaches would similarly require major structural changes in the land use sector of Non-Annex I Parties. Tackling the drivers of deforestation and degradation is a daunting undertaking.

Yet in the Annex I LULUCF negotiations, merely doing no worse than business-as-usual is considered a major accomplishment, deserving compliance credits. LULUCF target levels have to be called a Bar because a target is too scary and maybe you need to be drunk for it all to make sense.

In fact, there is a serious proposal on the table from the EU that would allow Parties to release *more* carbon to the atmosphere from forest management while taking no debits until forest management became an emissions source. Any Party that is currently a net sink would be given a huge 'get out of jail free' card. For the US, for example, this would allow an increase in net *total national* emissions of roughly 10% before even beginning to take a debit. Whatever they are drinking in the EU, we want some. And it seems like the EU has already shared with the Russians – already known for their vodka – who are calling for the same thing.

–continued on back page, col. 3

Climate Change is not Gender Neutral

Anyone who has witnessed the adverse impacts of climate change on communities knows that the poor are hurt first and worst, and often females are affected disproportionately. Women's historic disadvantages – limited access to resources, cultural barriers, restricted rights, under-representation in decision making – have made them more vulnerable to climate change impacts. In addition to making up 70% of the world's poorest, the mortality rates for females are higher than males in weather-related natural disasters.

Fortunately, the LCA text currently recognizes the importance of gender sensitivity in assessing and addressing climate change impacts on the most vulnerable populations – and this important language ought to be protected. In solidarity with our colleagues in the Global Gender and Climate Alliance, ECO would like to remind delegates that gender analysis should be an underlying principle for assessing and designing meaningful climate mitigation and adaptation strategies in any multilateral climate regime.

Shall I deal with your emissions now, sir?

A Smooth Guide

ECO joins the SBSTA Chair in welcoming the submission of the IPCC 2006 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. The Guidelines will assist Parties to prepare national emissions assessments that reflect what the atmosphere sees – an essential basis for informed policy decisions. ECO encourages SBSTA to recommend the Guidelines for adoption by COP15 for implementation in the post-2012 period.

These Guidelines continue IPCC's commitment to provide policy-relevant, but not policy-prescriptive advice. The 2006 Guidelines offer refined procedures and improved default data, but preserve the simpler options from earlier Guidelines for use by Parties in need of additional capacity building and improved national data.

ECO welcomes several refinements for forest carbon inventories that should help break logjams in the LULUCF and REDD negotiations. Under the IPCC 2006 Guidelines, it is best practice to report emissions associated with forest activities, including logging and conversion of natural forests to timber plantations.

The Guidelines apply to emissions from all carbon pools, including soil organic carbon, in "temporarily destocked" forests – an often overlooked, globally significant emission source associated with drained and cleared tropical peat land forests. Countries with tropical peat lands are further encouraged to use national data on carbon stocks in place of standard default values.

Parties had 21 months to submit comments on their experience with the Guidelines. Seven Parties and the EU did so. Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan and the EU support the Guidelines. Australia requested a delay until post-2012 policies have been determined. ECO is pleased to stand shoulder to shoulder with Saudi Arabia to invite "Annex I Parties to experiment using both the 1996 IPCC revised Guidelines and the 2006 IPCC Guidelines and to report their GHG inventories along with their experience and results...."

On Technology, ECO believes a number of items are absent from the current proposed legal text, which should be in there:–

- There is no technology text in the shared vision, only an intention to do so at a later date.
- There is no global technology objective.
- There is also a lack of concrete targets e.g. on RD & D and diffusion and transfer, and there are no obligations for joint R&D and Demonstration or Diffusion and Transfer.
- There is no consolidated framework on addressing IPR issues. There is too much of a focus on Voluntary Agreements.
- There is no coherent framework to link national technology plans or roadmaps with international technology objectives.
- There is a lack of attention to specific needs of the most vulnerable countries.

–Imagine, from front page

And while we are talking of urgency … did we not learn at the Hague and COP6-bis and Marrakech that we need accounting rules first and targets second to prevent gaming of the rules? This lesson seems to be lost on Parties that are complicating the negotiations with country-specific negotiations on baselines rather than settling on a consistent approach for all. Didn't we learn not to craft loopholes to avoid accounting for each Party's particular reasons for LULUCF emissions. Perhaps not. Perhaps countries have learned that LULUCF is a slush fund where you go to soften the targets.

Come on Annex 1 and sinks negotiators; you can do better than this.

LUDWIG

Ludwig as usual was late for the proceedings: his part-time jobs – both brain surgeon and rocket scientist – are so taxing!

As soon as he arrived, he set out in search of the bathroom, but accidentally found himself in a KP contact group, where Canada was enlightening developing countries as to how the virtuous Annex I countries have reduced emissions by 5% on 1990 levels. The distinguished representative of Canada neglected to mention its own 26% *increase* during this period. An oversight perhaps.

Later, stumbling into a side-event given by a well-known only remaining superpower, he was instantly thrown into confusion. This country seemed to be counting its international offsets as both international finance *and* a part of its domestic reduction commitments. Is this double-counting? Or is Ludwig just seeing double?